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Positive Announcements
Hans van Ditmarsch∗, Tim French†, James Hales‡
Abstract
Arbitrary public announcement logic (APAL) reasons about how the knowledge
of a set of agents changes after true public announcements and after arbitrary an-
nouncements of true epistemic formulas. We consider a variant of arbitrary public
announcement logic called positive arbitrary public announcement logic (APAL+),
which restricts arbitrary public announcements to announcement of positive formu-
las. Positive formulas prohibit statements about the ignorance of agents. The positive
formulas correspond to the universal fragment in first-order logic. As two successive
announcements of positive formulas need not correspond to the announcement of a
positive formula, APAL+ is rather different from APAL. We show that APAL+ is
more expressive than public announcement logic PAL, and that APAL+ is incom-
parable with APAL. We also provide a sound and complete infinitary axiomatisation.
Keywords: Dynamic Epistemic Logic, Multi-agent Systems, Universal Formulas
1 Introduction and overview
Public announcement logic (PAL) [20, 25] extends epistemic logic with operators for rea-
soning about the effects of specific public announcements. The formula [ψ]ϕ means that
“ϕ is true after the truthful announcement of ψ”. This means that, when interpreted in an
epistemic model with designated state, after submodel restriction to the states where ψ is
true (this includes the designated state, and ‘truthful’ here means true), ϕ is true in that
restriction. Arbitrary public announcement logic (APAL) [5] augments this with operators
for quantifying over public announcements. The formula 2ϕ means that “ϕ is true after
the truthful announcement of any formula that does not contain 2”.
Quantifying over the communication of information as in APAL has applications to
epistemic protocol synthesis, where we wish to achieve epistemic goals by communicating
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information to agents, but where we do not know of a specific protocol that will achieve
the goal, and where we may not even know if such a protocol exists. In principle, syn-
thesis problems can be solved by specifying them as formulas in the logic, and applying
model-checking or satisfiability procedures. However in the case of APAL, while there is a
PSPACE-complete model-checking procedure [1], the satisfiability problem is undecidable
in the presence of multiple agents [18].
We consider a variant of APAL called positive arbitrary public announcement logic
(APAL+), we obtain various semantic results relating refinements to positive formulas, we
give various rather surprising expressivity results, and we give a non-surprising axiomatiza-
tion. In APAL the arbitrary public announcements quantify over quantifier-free formulas,
that are equivalent to epistemic formulas (basic modal logic). Whereas in APAL+ the ar-
bitrary public announcements quantify over quantifier-free positive formulas: formula +ϕ
means that “ϕ is true after the truthful public announcement of any positive formula”.
A formula is positive if, roughly, the knowledge modalities are never bound by negations.
Positive formulas consist only of positive knowledge statements, such as “it is known that”,
and prohibit negative knowledge statements such as “it is not known that” and “it is uncer-
tain that”. In the standard translation, such formulas correspond to the universal fragment
[3].
The restriction to positive formulas is natural in view of possible applications. There
are many protocols wherein the messages convey that an agent knows an atomic propo-
sition and wherein only the invariants or postconditions require that an agent does not
know an atomic proposition. Knowledge of atomic propositions is stable and easy to verify
whereas absence of knowledge is fragile and, typically, hard to verify. For example, veri-
fying knowledge is done by direct observation such as witnessing a communication, or by
message passing between principals in a security protocol (where messages are considered
atomic components), or by reading a time-stamped blockchain ledger [27]. However, ver-
ifying that an agent does not know a proposition requires an assumption that there are
no private communication channels or clandestine messages, and thus negative knowledge
cannot be verified in the same way as positive knowledge. Consequently, quantifying over
positive announcements can often be viewed as quantifying over protocols consisting of
straightforwardly verifiable information. The decidability of positive arbitrary public an-
nouncement logic therefore means that we can answer the question whether it is possible
to achieve a particular knowledge state by means of such protocols.
Let us give some other concrete examples. In the alternating bit protocol [23] the
communicating agents achieve partial correctness of message transfer by stacking acknowl-
edgements (where ‘acknowledge’ means ‘know’). The internet protocol TCP/IP manages
package transfer, taking into account of missing packages and time-outs, again by means
of stacked knowledge [26]. In those case there are no concerns involving ignorance, it is a
matter of guaranteeing (partial) knowledge. In various security protocols the worst-case
scenario is that all messages between principals are intercepted, in other words, that they
become public announcements (all aspects of the protocol except private keys may be as-
sumed public). For example, in cards cryptography two communicating agents attempt to
learn the card deal without other players (eavesdroppers) learning the card deal (or even
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any single card other than their own) [15, 31, 13]. The dining cryptographers protocol
[12, 30] has semi-public (coin tossing, observed by an agent and its neighbour) and public
aspects (announcing bits, depending on the outcome of the coin toss and whether the agent
paid for the meal), in order to guarantee an ignorance epistemic goal (who paid for the
meal?). The public part consists of positive announcements (namely of known values of
bits).
The logic APAL+ is decidable. The proof of this result is substantial and of a fairly
technical nature and it is therefore reported in a companion paper [34]. As this result
puts APAL+ in perspective to similar logics, let us summarily sketch the picture. For an
in-depth discussion we refer to [34]. With respect to other logics with quantification over
announcements, APAL, the related group announcement logic, and coalition announcement
logic are all undecidable [2] (and all three are only known to have infinitary axiomatisa-
tions), whereas the ‘mental model’ arbitrary public announcement logic of [11] and boolean
arbitrary public announcement logic (BAPAL) [33] are decidable.
As the name suggests, BAPAL has quantification over boolean announcements [33].
This form of quantification is therefore even more restricted than in APAL+. Its axioma-
tisation is finitary, unlike APAL+, for which we only report an infinitary axiomatisation.
From the dynamic epistemic logics that are quantifying over non-public information
change, arbitrary arrow update logic [36] is undecidable, whereas the already mentioned
refinement modal logic [8] and arbitrary action model logic [21] are decidable. For the
last two logics this is an elementary consequence of the fact that they are as expressive
as the base modal logic. This is shown with respect to K models (models for arbitrary
accessibility relations). In [22] it is also shown that refinement modal logic interpreted on
models of the class S5 (where all accessibility relations are equivalence relations; the logic
is then called refinement epistemic logic) is as expressive as the modal logic S5.
We hope that the logic APAL+ offers a valuable contribution to this already diverse
landscape of logics with quantification over information change.
In Section 2 we give an overview of structures and structural notions, such as epistemic
model, bisimulation, and refinement, and we present public announcement logic and arbi-
trary public announcement logic. In Section 3 we give the syntax and semantics of positive
arbitrary public announcement logic APAL+. In Section 4 we show that APAL+ model
checking is PSPACE-complete. In Section 5 we demonstrate that APAL and APAL+ are
incomparable. In Section 6 we give the complete infinitary axiomatisation of APAL+.
2 Public announcement logics
We recall definitions and technical results from epistemic logic, public announcement
logic [20, 25] and arbitrary public announcement logic [5]. Throughout this contribu-
tion, let A be a countable set of agents and let P be a countable set of propositional atoms
(or atoms, or propositional variables).
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2.1 Structural notions
In this subsection we define epistemic models, model restrictions, and various types of
bisimulation.
Definition 2.1 An epistemic model M = (S,∼, V ) consists of a domain S , which is a
non-empty set of states, a set of accessibility relations ∼, indexed by agents a ∈ A, where
∼a ⊆ S × S is an equivalence relation on states (a relation that is reflexive, transitive and
symmetric), and a valuation V : S → P(P ), which is a function from states to subsets of
propositional atoms (namely those true in that state).
The class of all epistemic models is called S5 . A pointed epistemic model Ms =
((S,∼, V ), s) consists of an epistemic model M along with a designated state s ∈ S .
A pointed epistemic model will often also be called an epistemic model.
Given two states s, t ∈ S , we write s∼at to denote that (s, t) ∈ ∼a. We write [s]a to
denote the a-equivalence class of s, which is the set of states [s]a = {t ∈ S | s∼at}. As we
will often be required to discuss several models at once, we will use the convention that
Ms = ((S,∼, V ), s), M
′
s′ = ((S
′,∼′, V ′), s′), Mγsγ = ((S
γ,∼γ , V γ), sγ), etc. If s ∼a t, we
say that there is an a-link (a-step) between s and t. An epistemic model is connected if
between any two states in its domain there is a path consisting of such links, i.e., if for any
states s, t there are states s = s1, s2, . . . , sn = t and agents a1, . . . , an−1 such that for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, si ∼ai si+1.
Definition 2.2 Let M = (S,∼, V ) ∈ S5 be an epistemic model and T ⊆ S where ∅ 6= T .
We define the restriction of M to T as M |T = (S |T ,∼|T , V |T ) where:
S |T = T
∼a|T = ∼a ∩ (T × T )
V |T (p) = V (p) ∩ T
If N is a restriction of M we write N ⊆M .
Definition 2.3 Let M = (S,∼, V ) ∈ S5 and M ′ = (S ′,∼′, V ′) ∈ S5 be epistemic models.
A non-empty relation R ⊆ S × S ′ is a bisimulation if and only if for every (s, s′) ∈ R,
p ∈ P , and a ∈ A the conditions atoms-p, forth-a and back-a hold.
• atoms-p: s ∈ V (p) if and only if s′ ∈ V ′(p).
• forth-a: For every t∼as there exists t
′∼′as
′ such that (t, t′) ∈ R.
• back-a: For every t′∼′as
′ there exists t∼as such that (t, t
′) ∈ R.
If (s, s′) ∈ R then we call Ms and M
′
s′ bisimilar and write Ms ≃ M
′
s′ or (to indicate the
relation) R : Ms ≃ M
′
s′. If for all s ∈ S there is an s
′ ∈ S ′ such that Ms ≃ M
′
s′, and for
all s′ ∈ S ′ there is an s ∈ S such that Ms ≃ M
′
s′, we write M ≃ M
′.
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We note that the union of two bisimulations is a bisimulation, and that there is a maximal
bisimulation between the states of an epistemic model, which is an equivalence relation,
see [7] for such standard notions. A model is bisimulation minimal iff for any s, t ∈ S, Ms
is not bisimilar to Mt.
We will also require the notions of restricted bisimulation (restricted to a set of atoms
Q ⊆ P ) and bounded bisimulation (bounded to a depth n ∈ N). Q-Bisimulations are in-
tended to preserve modal formulas that contain only atoms fromQ, whereas n-bisimulations
are intended to preserve the truth of formulas ϕ with wherein stacks of epistemic operators
have maximal depth n (this notion will be defined later).
Definition 2.4 Let M,M ′ ∈ S5 be epistemic models and let Q ⊆ P be a set of proposi-
tional atoms. A non-empty relation R ⊆ S×S ′ is a Q-bisimulation if and only if for every
(s, s′) ∈ R and a ∈ A, forth-a and back-a hold, whereas atoms-p is only required to hold
for all p ∈ Q. If (s, s′) ∈ R then we call Ms and M
′
s′ Q-bisimilar and write Ms ≃
Q M ′s′.
The notion of n-bisimulation, for n ∈ N, is given by defining a set of relations R0 ⊇ · · · ⊇
Rn.
Definition 2.5 Let M,M ′ ∈ S5 be epistemic models, and n ∈ N. A non-empty relation
R0 ⊆ S × S ′ is a 0-bisimulation if and only if for every (s, s′) ∈ R0 and for every p ∈ P
• atoms-p: s ∈ V (p) if and only if s′ ∈ V ′(p).
A non-empty relation Rn+1 ⊆ S × S ′ is an (n + 1)-bisimulation if and only if for every
(s, s′) ∈ Rn+1, for all p ∈ P , and for every a ∈ A, there is an n-bisimulation Rn ⊇ Rn+1
such that:
• (n+ 1)-forth-a: For every t∼as there exists t
′∼′as
′ such that (t, t′) ∈ Rn;
• (n+ 1)-back-a: For every t′∼′as
′ there exists t∼as such that (t, t
′) ∈ Rn.
If (s, s′) ∈ Rn for an n-bisimulation Rn, then we call Ms and M
′
s′ n-bisimilar and write
Ms ≃
n M ′s′.
2.2 Syntax and semantics of public announcement logics
We now define the syntax and semantics of epistemic logic S5 , public announcement logic
PAL, and arbitrary public announcement logic APAL.
Definition 2.6 The language of arbitrary public announcement logic Lapal is the set of
formulas generated by the following rule, where p ∈ P and a ∈ A. Typical members of Lapal
are denoted by lower case Greek letters ϕ, ψ, etc., possibly primed.
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | Kaϕ | [ϕ]ϕ | 2ϕ
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We will follow the usual rules for omission of parentheses. We use all of the standard
abbreviations for propositional logic, and additionally the abbreviations Laϕ ::= ¬Ka¬ϕ,
〈ϕ〉ψ ::= ¬[ϕ]¬ψ, and 3ϕ ::= ¬2¬ϕ. We also consider the language of public announce-
ment logic, Lpal , consisting of Lapal without the 2 operator, the language of epistemic
logic, Lel , consisting of Lpal without [·] operators, and the language of propositional logic,
Lpl , without any modalities. A formula in Lel is an epistemic formula, and a formula
in Lpl is a boolean. The epistemic depth of a formula in Lapal counts the number of
stacked Ka operators (while ignoring the 2 operators), i.e., d(Kaϕ) = d(ϕ) + 1, and
d(p) = 0, d(2ϕ) = d(¬ϕ) = d(ϕ), d(ϕ ∧ ψ) = max{d(ϕ), d(ψ)}, d([ϕ]ψ) = d(ϕ) + d(ψ).
We write v(ϕ) for the set of propositional variables occurring in ϕ, where v(p) = {p},
v(Kaϕ) = v(2ϕ) = v(¬ϕ) = v(ϕ), and v([ϕ]ψ) = v(ϕ ∧ ψ) = v(ϕ) ∪ v(ψ).
Definition 2.7 The binary satisfaction relation |= between pointed epistemic models and
Lapal formulas is defined as follows by induction on formula structure. LetM = (S,∼, V ) ∈
S5 be an epistemic model. Then:
Ms |= p iff s ∈ V (p)
Ms |= ¬ϕ iff Ms 6|= ϕ
Ms |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff Ms |= ϕ and Ms |= ψ
Ms |= Kaϕ iff for every t ∼a s :Mt |= ϕ
Ms |= [ϕ]ψ iff if Ms |= ϕ then (M |ϕ)s |= ψ
Ms |= 2ϕ iff for every ψ ∈ Lel :Ms |= [ψ]ϕ
where M |ϕ = M |[[ϕ]]M with [[ϕ]]M = {s ∈ S |Ms |= ϕ}.
When Ms |= ϕ, we say that ϕ is true in Ms (or in state s of M), or that Ms satisfies ϕ. In
the semantics of 2, a ψ such that Ms |= [ψ]ϕ is called a witness of the quantifier 2.
A model restrictionM |ϕ to a formula ϕ restricts the domain ofM to those states where
ϕ is true. This is the basis of the semantics of public announcements. We note that ϕ
may no longer be true in that model restriction. A typical counterexample is the Moore
sentence p∧¬Kap: whenever true, after its announcement it is false. The restriction M |ϕ
is also called the result of the announcement of ϕ in M .
Whenever Ms |= ϕ for all s ∈ S, we write M |= ϕ (ϕ is valid on M), and when M |= ϕ
for all M of class S5 , we write S5 |= ϕ and we say that ϕ is valid. Formula ϕ ∈ Lapal is
satisfiable if there is an epistemic model Ms such that Ms |= ϕ.
Let Ms and M
′
s′ be given. If for all ϕ ∈ Lapal , Ms |= ϕ if and only if M
′
s′ |= ϕ, then Ms
and M ′s′ are modally equivalent, for which we write Ms ≡apal M
′
s′. For modal equivalence
for formulas up to modal depth n we write Ms ≡
n
apal M
′
s′, and for modal equivalence for
formulas in the language restricted to atoms in Q ⊆ P we write Ms ≡
Q
apal M
′
s′.
Public announcement logic PAL and epistemic logic S5 have the same semantics as
APAL but defined on the languages Lpal and Lel , respectively. The notation used for
modal equivalence in Lel is ≡el (the logics PAL and S5 are equally expressive [25]); for the
same up to modal depth n it is ≡nel , and in the language restricted to atoms in Q ⊆ P it
is ≡Qel .
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We continue with elementary results on the relation between bisimulation and modal
equivalence.
Lemma 2.8 ([24]) Let Ms ,M
′
s′ ∈ S5 be epistemic models. Then Ms ≃ M
′
s′ implies
Ms ≡el M
′
s′.
Lemma 2.9 ([24]) Let Ms,M
′
s′ ∈ S5 be image-finite epistemic models (each state has
finitely many accessible states). Then Ms ≡el M
′
s′ implies Ms ≃ M
′
s′.
These are well-known results. We observe that Lemma 2.8 can be generalised to the lan-
guages Lpal and Lapal (i.e., to modal equivalence of pointed epistemic models in the respec-
tive logics), as public announcements and arbitrary public announcements are bisimulation
invariant operations. The latter was shown in [1] for the logic GAL, but the proof also
applies to APAL; see also the similar proof for APAL+ in Lemma 3.12, later.
Analogous results to Lemma 2.8 apply to Q-bisimulations when we restrict the language
of epistemic formulas to propositional atoms in Q, and analogous results also apply to n-
bisimulations.
Lemma 2.10 ([14, 16]) Let Ms ,M
′
s′ ∈ S5 be epistemic models and let Q ⊆ P . Then
Ms ≃
Q M ′s′ implies Ms ≡
Q
el M
′
s′.
Lemma 2.11 ([7, Prop. 2.31]) Let Ms ,M
′
s′ ∈ S5 be epistemic models and let n ∈ N.
Then Ms ≃
n M ′s′ implies Ms ≡
n
el M
′
s′.
Again, both generalise to the language Lpal . However, they do not generalise to the language
Lapal . This is because in the restricted logical language the arbitrary announcement still
quantifies over all propositional variables and not only over those in Q, and, respectively,
because the arbitrary announcement quantifies over formulas of arbitrarily large epistemic
depth, and not only over formulas of at most the epistemic depth of the formula bound
by the arbitrary announcement. We will get back to this after presenting the expressivity
results for public announcement logics, in the next section.
A common epistemic model in our contribution is the a-b-chain. We therefore introduce
it in this section, as well as results on distinguishing formulas for a-b-chains.
Consider the epistemic model M = (S,∼, V ) for two agents a, b and a set of atoms P
(often a singleton P = {p}) such that S is a subset of the integers Z, ∼a is the symmetric
and reflexive closure of S2 ∩ {(2n, 2n + 1) | n ∈ Z}, ∼b is the symmetric and reflexive
closure of S2 ∩ {(2n, 2n − 1) | n ∈ Z}, and without any requirement on the valuation.
As the a-links and b-links between states alternate in the model, such a model is called
an a-b-chain, or simply a chain. We also require that the model M is connected, i.e.,
that between any two states in the domain S a path of such a-links and b-links exists.
Differently said, a broken chain makes two chains. The names of the states are arbitrary;
any isomorphic model will also be called a chain. A chain is finite iff the domain S is finite.
A finite chain has a largest and a smallest element of the domain. These are called the
ends or the edges of the chain. Observe that an edge is a singleton ∼a-class or ∼b-class,
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and that all other equivalence classes consist of two states. Chains that only have a largest
or smallest element only have one edge. They are isomorphic to N. A prefix of an a-b-chain
is a submodel that is an a-b-chain and that contains an edge.
We now introduce the distinguishing formula. Given a logical language L and a seman-
tics, such as the above for Lapal , and given a model M = (S,∼, V ) and a subset T ⊆ S, a
distinguishing formula for T is some δ ∈ L such that Mt |= δ for all t ∈ T and Mt 6|= δ for
all t 6∈ T .
It is well-known that all subsets of a finite (bisimulation minimal) epistemic model
are distinguishable in the language Lel of epistemic logic (see [28] or the more recent [32]
discussing it; an older source in a slightly different setting is [9]).
Lemma 2.12 Let M = (S,∼, V ) be a (bisimulation minimal) finite a-b-chain and let
B ⊆ N. Then B has a distinguishing formula.
Similarly, if the edge of a one-edged infinite a-b-chain has a distinguishing formula, then
all finite subsets of chain can be distinguished. In order to prove this we first define:
L0ab = L
0
ba := ǫ, and for n ≥ 0, L
2n+1
ab δ0 := LbL
2n
ab , L
2n+2
ab := LaL
2n+1
ab , L
2n+1
ba δ0 := LaL
2n
ba ,
L2n+2ba := LbL
2n+1
ba . Informally, L
n
ab is a stack of n alternating La and Lb operators of which
the last one, if any, is Lb, whereas L
n
ba is a stack of n alternating La and Lb operators of
which the last one, if any, is La. Note that for any formula ϕ, L
0
abϕ = L
0
baϕ = ϕ. Similarly
to Lnab and L
n
ba, we define K
n
ab and K
n
ba.
Lemma 2.13 Let M = (S,∼, V ) be a one-edged infinite a-b-chain such that the edge has
a distinguishing formula and let B ⊆ S be finite. Then B has a distinguishing formula.
Proof Without loss of generality we assume that S = N (so that B ⊆ N is a set of natural
numbers), that the edge is state 0, and that 0 ∼a 1. Let the assumed δ0 ∈ Lel be such
that M0 |= δ0 and for all i > 0, Mi 6|= δ0.
1 Obviously, Mn |= L
n
baδ0. However, also, for all
states i ≤ n, Mi |= L
n
baδ0, as all states are a-accessible and b-accessible to themselves. Now
let for n > 0, δn := L
n
baδ0 ∧ ¬L
n−1
ba δ0. From Mi |= L
i
baδ0 for all i ≤ n and Mj |= ¬L
j−1
ba δ0
for all j > n it follows that Mn |= δn and that Mk 6|= δn for any k 6= n. Therefore δn is
a distinguishing formula for state n ∈ N, and thus the distinguishing formula δB for B is∨
i∈B δi. 
We will use this result frequently in subsequent proofs. Note that the distinguishing formula
is in Lel . Whether a distinguishing formula also exists in L
+
el depends on the valuation.
2.3 Expressivity of public announcement logics
Given logical languages L and L ′, and a class of models in which L and L ′ are both
interpreted (employing a satisfaction relation |= resp. |=′), we say that L is at least as
1We did not require that M is bisimulation minimal in the formulation of the lemma. The minimality
follows from the existence of δ0. Further note that M |B need not be an a-b-chain, it may be disconnected.
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{p} {}
a
M s:
{p, q} {}
{p, q} {q}
a
a
b b
M ′s′:
{p, q} {}
{p, q} {q}
a
b
(M ′|q)s′:
Figure 1: Models used in the proof of Proposition 2.16. The actual states are underlined.
We will always assume reflexive and symmetric closure of accessibility relations.
expressive as L ′, if every formula in L ′ is equivalent to a formula in L (where ‘ϕ′ ∈ L ′ is
equivalent to ϕ ∈ L ’ means: for all Ms, Ms |=
′ ϕ′ if and only if Ms |= ϕ). If L is not at
least as expressive as L ′ and L ′ is not at least as expressive as L , then L is incomparable
to L ′ (L and L ′ are incomparable). If L is at least as expressive as L ′, and L ′ is at least as
expressive as L , then L is as expressive as L ′ (L and L ′ are equally expressive). Finally,
if L is at least as expressive as L ′ but L ′ is not at least as expressive as L , then L is more
expressive than L ′. So, ‘more’ means ‘strictly more’. The combination of a language with
a semantics given a class of models determines a logic. In this work we only consider model
class S5. Also, in this work the clause of the satisfaction relation for a modality is the same
for all languages containing that modality, so that it suffices only to employ |=. “Given
logic L1 with language L1 interpreted on model class X1 by way of satisfaction relation
|=1, and logic L2 with language L2 interpreted on model class X2 by way of satisfaction
relation |=2, L1 is more expressive than L2,” therefore becomes “given language L , model
class X and satisfaction relation |=, logic L1 with language L1 ⊆ L , and logic L2 with
language L2 ⊆ L , L1 is more expressive than L2.” We therefore abbreviate the latter by
“L1 is more expressive than L2,” and similarly for other expressivity terminology.
The following expressivity results are shown by Plaza [25] (Proposition 2.14), and by
Balbiani et al. [5] (Propositions 2.15 and 2.16). We give the proof of Proposition 2.16 in
detail, including an alternative proof (that is not known from the literature), as we will use
these methods later when obtaining additional expressivity results for positive arbitrary
public announcement logic.
Lemma 2.14 PAL is as expressive as S5 (for single or multiple agents).
Proposition 2.15 APAL is as expressive as PAL for a single agent.
Proposition 2.16 APAL is (strictly) more expressive than PAL for multiple agents.
Proof Suppose that arbitrary public announcement logic is as expressive as public an-
nouncement logic in S5 for more than one agent. We note that public announcement logic
is also as expressive as epistemic logic S5 . Consider the formula 3(Kap∧¬KbKap). Then
there exists a formula ϕ ∈ Lel that is equivalent to 3(Kap ∧ ¬KbKap). There will be
some propositional variable q not occurring in ϕ. Consider S5 models M and M ′ as in
Figure 1; let the underlined states be called s and s′, respectively. We note thatMs ≃
p M ′s′
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and, as q does not appear in ϕ, then Ms |= ϕ if and only if M
′
s′ |= ϕ. However Ms 6|=
3(Kap∧¬KbKap), whereas M
′
s′ |= 3(Kap∧¬KbKap) because M
′
s′ |= 〈q〉(Kap∧¬KbKap).
This is a contradiction. 
Another proof of larger expressivity does not use that 3 quantifies over arbitrarily many
propositional variables but that 3 quantifies over formulas of arbitrarily large epistemic
depth. It is due to Barteld Kooi. It is relevant to mention this alternative proof here,
because we will use a similar technique in Section 5 on the expressivity of APAL+. Note
that all models used in this proof are a-b-chains.
Proof Suppose that arbitrary public announcement logic is as expressive as public an-
nouncement logic in S5 for more than one agent. Then (again) there exists a formula
ϕ ∈ Lel that is equivalent to 3(Kap ∧ ¬KbKap). Let d(ϕ) be the epistemic depth of
this formula. Now consider (see Figure 2) model Nt. We can see it as some sort of infi-
nite S5 unwinding of model Ms: Nt is bisimilar to Ms. A bisimulation between Ms and
Nt links all the p-states in N to the single p-state in M , and all the ¬p-states in N to
the single ¬p-state in M . So, in particular, this bisimulation contains pair (t, s). Now
consider a model that is like Nt, but cut off at the right-hand side, as in model N
′
t′ in
Figure 2, where the cut-off is beyond the epistemic depth of ϕ: let j > d(ϕ) be such
that the length of the a-b-path from the root t′ to the edge is j and let that rightmost
point be called v. State v is the unique state satisfying Kap. Because of Lemma 2.13 we
now can uniquely identify all finite subsets of N ′t′ . Therefore, there is an announcement
ψ such that (N ′|ψ)t′ is the final depicted model, where we note that, ignoring the value
of q, it is the same as the model (M ′|q)s′ in Figure 1. Announcement ψ is the formula
(LjbaKap ∧ ¬L
j−1
ba Kap) ∨ (L
j+1
ba Kap ∧ ¬L
j
baKap) ∨ (L
j+2
ba Kap ∧ ¬L
j+1
ba Kap). (We refer to the
proof of Lemma 2.13 for definition of Lnab and L
n
ba.) This formula can be simplified to
Lj+2ba Kap ∧¬L
j−1
ba Kap. From (N
′|ψ)t′ |= Kap ∧¬KbKap follows N
′
t′ |= 〈ψ〉(Kap∧ ¬KbKap)
and thus N ′t′ |= 3(Kap ∧ ¬KbKap). However, as before, Ms 6|= 3(Kap ∧ ¬KbKap), and
therefore, as Ms ≃ Nt, also Nt 6|= 3(Kap ∧ ¬KbKap). On the other hand, (Ms and) Nt
and N ′t′ have the same value for ϕ, as the difference between the two models is beyond the
epistemic depth of ϕ:
As j > d(ϕ), up to depth d(ϕ) the models Nt and N
′
t′ are isomorphic and therefore
bisimilar, i.e., Nt ≃
d(ϕ) N ′t′ . Now applying Lemma 2.11 we obtain Nt ≡
d(ϕ)
el N
′
t′ , and
therefore in particular Nt |= ϕ iff N
′
t′ |= ϕ. Again we have a contradiction. 
These different proofs to establish larger expressivity illustrate a important difference
between APAL and other public announcement logics. Let us first introduce additional
notation. Let Ms ≡
Q
apal M
′
s′ (where Q ⊆ P ) mean that for all ϕ ∈ Lapal with atoms
restricted to Q, Ms |= ϕ if and only if M
′
s′ |= ϕ, and let Ms ≡
n
apal M
′
s′ (where n ∈ N) mean
that for all ϕ ∈ Lapal with d(ϕ) ≤ n, Ms |= ϕ if and only if M
′
s′ |= ϕ.
Although Ms ≃ M
′
s′ implies Ms ≡apal M
′
s′ , we do not have that Ms ≃
Q M ′s′ (always)
implies Ms ≡
Q
apal M
′
s′ and we also do not have that Ms ≃
n M ′s′ (always) implies Ms ≡
n
apal
M ′s′ .
The models used in Figure 1 provide typical (counter)examples. We note that
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Figure 2: More models used in the proof of Proposition 2.16.
Ms ≃
p M ′s′ but Ms 6≡
p
apal M
′
s′ ,
because Ms |= 3(Kap∧¬KbKap) whereas M
′
s′ 6|= 3(Kap∧¬KbKap). In the language Lapal
restricted to p, the arbitrary announcement modalities are still interpreted over all atoms
P , so they quantify not only over Lel formulas only containing atom p but also over Lel
formulas possibly containing atom q as well.
Similarly, we note that, as shown in the alternative proof for Prop. 2.16,
Nt ≃
2 N ′t′ but Nt 6≡
2
apal N
′
t′ .
This is because on the one hand Nt |= 3(Kap ∧ ¬KbKap), whereas on the other hand
N ′t′ 6|= 3(Kap ∧ ¬KbKap), as N
′
t′ 6|= 〈ψ〉(Kap ∧ ¬KbKap) for some ψ ∈ Lel with d(ψ) > 2.
However, this does not rule out that bounded (to some n) bisimilarity implies bounded
modal equivalence in a particular model. This will be used in an expressivity proof com-
paring APAL and APAL+, later (Theorem 5.19 on page 33).
2.4 Positive formulas
The positive formulas are the universal fragment of epistemic logic. They play an important
role in our work, also in relation to the structural notion of refinement, that is therefore
only defined in this section.
Definition 2.17 The language of positive formulas L+el is defined inductively as:
ϕ ::= p | ¬p | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | (ϕ ∨ ϕ) | Kaϕ
where p ∈ P and a ∈ A.
We note that L+el is a fragment of Lel .
Lemma 2.18 Positive formulas are preserved under public announcements:
For all ϕ ∈ L+el , ψ ∈ Lel : Ms |= ϕ implies Ms |= [ψ]ϕ.
Corollary 2.19 Positive formulas are successful as public announcements:
For all ϕ ∈ L+el : Ms |= ϕ implies Ms |= [ϕ]ϕ.
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Corollary 2.20 Positive formulas are idempotent as public announcements:
For all ϕ ∈ L+el , ψ ∈ Lel : Ms |= [ϕ]ψ implies Ms |= [ϕ][ϕ]ψ.
These results were shown by van Ditmarsch and Kooi [35, Prop. 8] for an extended fragment
also containing the inductive clause [¬ϕ]ϕ. In their work positive formulas are called
preserved formulas instead. The results go back to van Benthem [29].
A refinement is a relation that is a generalisation of bisimulation, and that only requires
the atoms and back condition to hold. Refinements (in this form) were introduced in [8].
Definition 2.21 Let M,M ′ ∈ S5 be epistemic models. A non-empty relation R ⊆ S × S ′
is a refinement if and only if for every (s, s′) ∈ R, p ∈ P , and a ∈ A, the conditions
atoms-p and back-a hold. If (s, s′) ∈ R then we call M ′s′ a refinement of Ms and call Ms
a simulation of M ′s′. We write M
′
s′  Ms or equivalently Ms  M
′
s′.
There are other notions of refinement. For example, in [7], simulation is defined with an
inclusion requirement for atoms: for each pair (s, s′) in the relation, s ∈ V (p) implies
s′ ∈ V ′(p); instead of full correspondence atoms: s ∈ V (p) if and only if s′ ∈ V ′(p). The
dual of that notion of simulation leads to a different notion of refinement.
Lemma 2.22 The relation  is a preorder on epistemic models.
Lemma 2.23 Let Ms ,M
′
s′ ∈ S5 be epistemic models such that Ms  M
′
s′ and let ϕ ∈ L
+
el
be a positive formula. If Ms |= ϕ then M
′
s′ |= ϕ.
These results were shown by Bozzelli et al. in [8, Prop. 2 & 8]. We note that the union of
two refinements is a refinement and that there is a maximal refinement between epistemic
models (this is shown just as for bisimulation).
The relation between positive formulas and refinement is intricate. One important (and
unreported) result is as follows. It follows from similar reasoning to Lemma 2.9, but in
view of its novelty and because we will refer to it later, we give the proof.
Lemma 2.24 Let M,M ′ ∈ S5 be image-finite epistemic models and let R ⊆ S ×S ′ be the
relation such that (s, s′) ∈ R if and only if for every ϕ ∈ L+el : if Ms |= ϕ then M
′
s′ |= ϕ. If
R is non-empty, then R is a refinement.
Proof Let (s, s′) ∈ R.
The clause atoms is satisfied because Ms |= p implies M
′
s′ |= p, and also Ms |= ¬p
implies M ′s′ |= ¬p.
Let us now consider back, and suppose this clause is not satisfied. Then there is a t′
with s′ ∼a t
′ (i.e., an a-successor t′ of s′) such that none of the finite a-successors t1, . . . , tn
of s are in the relation R with t′, i.e., (t1, t
′) 6∈ R,. . . ,(tn, t
′) 6∈ R. Therefore, using the
definition of R, for each ti, where i = 1, . . . , n, there is a ϕi ∈ L
+
el such that Mti |= ϕi
but M ′t′ 6|= ϕi. Therefore Ms |= Ka(ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕn), whereas Ms′ 6|= Ka(ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕn).
Observe that Ka(ϕ1∨ . . .∨ϕn) is a positive formula (the positive formulas are closed under
disjunction and under Ka). This contradicts our assumption that (s, s
′) ∈ R. 
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3 Positive arbitrary public announcement logic
In this section we give the syntax and semantics of positive arbitrary public announce-
ment logic APAL+, and we provide some semantic results about the properties of positive
announcements and arbitrary positive announcement operators.
Definition 3.1 The language of positive arbitrary public announcement logic L+apal is de-
fined inductively as:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | Kaϕ | [ϕ]ϕ | +ϕ
where p ∈ P and a ∈ A.
We use the abbreviation 3+ϕ ::= ¬+¬ϕ. The epistemic depth and the set of variables of a
formula are defined as before.
Definition 3.2 Let M = (S,∼, V ) ∈ S5 be an epistemic model. The interpretation of
ϕ ∈ L+apal is defined inductively as in Def. 2.7, but with the following clause for positive
arbitrary announcement:
Ms |= +ϕ iff for every ψ ∈ L
+
el : Ms |= [ψ]ϕ
So, the difference with the semantics for the arbitrary announcement in APAL is the
part ‘for every ψ ∈ L+el ’ instead of ‘for every ψ ∈ Lel ’. Validity, satisfiability and modal
equivalence (notation ≡apal+) are defined as before.
An important observation is the partial correspondence between the results of positive
announcements and model restrictions that are closed under refinements, a notion that we
will define now.
Definition 3.3 Let M = (S,∼, V ) ∈ S5 be an epistemic model and let T ⊆ S be a non-
empty set of states. We say that T is closed under refinements in M if and only if for
every s, t ∈ S such that Ms  Mt : if s ∈ T then t ∈ T . We say that the model restriction
M |T is closed under refinements if and only if T is closed under refinements in M .
Lemma 3.4 The result of any positive announcement is closed under refinements.
Proof Let M = (S,∼, V ) ∈ S5 be an epistemic model and let ϕ ∈ L+el . We have to
show that a non-empty M |ϕ (i.e., M |[[ϕ]]M ) is closed under refinements. Suppose that
s, t ∈ S such that s ∈ [[ϕ]]M and Ms  Mt . Then Ms |= ϕ. As Ms  Mt and ϕ ∈ L
+
el
then by Lemma 2.23 we have Mt |= ϕ. So t ∈ [[ϕ]]M and therefore M |ϕ is closed under
refinements. 
Lemma 3.5 On finite models, a model restriction that is closed under refinements is the
result of a positive announcement.
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Figure 3: Counterexample for the composability of positive announcements. Left: initial
model, with explicit refinement relation. Middle: after announcing Kap. Right: after
subsequently announcing ¬q ∨Kbq.
Proof Let M = (S,∼, V ) ∈ S5 be an epistemic model and let T ⊆ S be a non-empty set
of states such that M |T is closed under refinements. Then for every s ∈ T and t ∈ S \ T
we have that Ms 6 Mt . As M is image-finite it then follows from Lemma 2.24 that for
every s ∈ T and t ∈ S \ T there exists ϕs,t ∈ L
+
el such that Ms |= ϕs,t but Mt 6|= ϕs,t. Let
ϕ =
∨
s∈T
∧
t∈S\T ϕs,t. Then ϕ ∈ L
+
el ; for every s ∈ T : Ms |= ϕ; and for every t ∈ S \ T :
Mt 6|= ϕ. So [[ϕ]]M = T and therefore M |T is the result of a positive announcement. 
In contrast to public announcements, a sequence of positive announcements cannot
generally be expressed as a single positive announcement.
Proposition 3.6 Arbitrary positive announcements are not composable in S5 , i.e., it is
not the case that S5 |= 3+ 3+ϕ→ 3+ϕ for all ϕ ∈ L
+
apal .
Proof We construct a counter-example. Consider model M = (S,∼, V ) in Figure 3,
where S = {s, t, u, v, w, s′, t′, u′, v′}, s∼at∼as
′∼at
′, u∼av∼aw, u
′∼av
′, s∼bs
′, t∼bu, t
′∼bu
′,
V (p) = {s, t, u, v, s′, t′, u′, v′}, and V (q) = {t, v, s′, t′, v′}.
We claim that Ms |= 3+ 3+ (Laq∧Ka(Kbq∨Kb¬q)) but Ms 6|= 3+ (Laq∧Ka(Kbq∨Kb¬q)).
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We note that (M |Kap|(¬q ∨Kbq))s |= Laq ∧ Ka(Kbq ∨ Kb¬q) (see Figure 3) and so
Ms |= 3+ 3+ (Laq ∧Ka(Kbq ∨Kb¬q)).
Let R = {(x, x) | x ∈ S} ∪ {(t, t′), (u, u′), (v, v′), (s′, t′), (t′, v′), (s, u′)}. We note that
R is a refinement.
As Ms′  Mt′ , Mt  Mt′ , and Mt′  Mt′ , then by Lemma 3.4 any positive announce-
ment that is true in Ms and that preserves s
′ or t (or t′) will also preserve t′ so any positive
announcement after which Laq is true will preserve t
′.
Also, as Ms  Mu′ then by Lemma 3.4 any positive announcement that is true in Ms
will preserve u′.
Therefore, any positive announcement that is true in Ms and preserves one of the
a-accessible states t, s′ and t′ (such that Laq is true after the announcement), will also
preserve t′, and also u′ that is b-accessible from t′, such that ¬(Kbq ∨Kb¬q) is true in t
′
after the announcement, and therefore La¬(Kbq ∨Kb¬q) true in s.
So if after any positive announcement in s Laq is true, then ¬Ka(Kbq ∨Kb¬q) is also
true. ThereforeMs |= + (Laq → ¬Ka(Kbq∨Kb¬q)) and soMs 6|= 3+ (Laq∧Ka(Kbq∨Kb¬q)).

However, other validities involving the quantifier are the same for APAL and for
APAL+. We list a few.
Lemma 3.7 ([5, Lemmas 3.1 & 3.9]) Let ϕ, ψ ∈ L+apal . Then:
1. S5 |= + (ϕ ∧ ψ)↔ (+ϕ ∧+ψ);
2. S5 |= ϕ implies S5 |= +ϕ;
3. S5 |= +ϕ→ ϕ;
4. S5 |= Ka+ϕ→ +Kaϕ.
Proof The proofs are exactly as in [5]. The first two directly follow from the semantics
of + . For the third, note that S5 |= +ϕ→ [⊤]ϕ and S5 |= [⊤]ϕ↔ ϕ.
For the last, suppose that Ms |= Ka+ϕ, that Ms |= ψ for ψ ∈ L
+
el , and that t is in the
domain of M |ψ such that s ∼a t. We have to show that (M |ψ)t |= ϕ. As s ∼a t also holds
in M , from the assumption Ms |= Ka+ϕ it follows that Mt |= +ϕ. As t is in the domain
of M |ψ, Mt |= ψ. From Mt |= +ϕ and Mt |= ψ follows (M |ψ)t |= ϕ, as required. 
We now proceed to prove that, like the APAL quantifier, the APAL+ quantifier also
satisfies the Church-Rosser and McKinsey properties. As our proof of Church-Rosser is
very different from that in [5], we give the proofs of these properties and also the proofs of
the lemmas on which they depend in detail.
Given a model M = (S,∼, V ), if for all p ∈ Q ⊆ P , V (p) = ∅ or V (p) = S, we say that
the valuation of the atoms in Q is constant on M .
Lemma 3.8 ([5, Lemma 3.2]) Let ϕ ∈ L+apal and let M ∈ S5 be a model on which the
valuation of atoms in v(ϕ) is constant. Then M |= ϕ or M |= ¬ϕ.
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Proof Let p ∈ v(ϕ). Let ψ(⊤/p) be the substitution of all occurrences of p in ϕ by ⊤.
As the valuation of p is constant, then if p is true on M we have that M |= ϕ↔ ϕ(⊤/p).
Similarly, if p is false on M , then M |= ϕ ↔ ϕ(⊥/p). Let ϕ′ be the result of successively
substituting all p ∈ v(ϕ) by ⊤ or ⊥ in this way. Clearly M |= ϕ ↔ ϕ′. Using the
S5 validities Ka⊤ ↔ ⊤, Ka⊥ ↔ ⊥, using S5 |= +⊤ ↔ ⊤ and S5 |= +⊥ ↔ ⊥, and
using propositional properties of combining ⊤ and ⊥, we obtain that S5 |= ϕ′ ↔ ⊤ or
S5 |= ϕ′ ↔ ⊤. Thus we also have that M |= ϕ↔ ⊤ or M |= ϕ↔ ⊤, in other words, that
M |= ϕ or M |= ¬ϕ. 
Lemma 3.9 ([5, Lemma 3.3]) Let ϕ ∈ L+apal and let M = (S,∼, V ) ∈ S5 be a model on
which the valuation of atoms in v(ϕ) is constant. Then M |= ϕ→ +ϕ.
Proof Let s ∈ S and Ms |= ϕ. Now consider ψ ∈ L
+
el such that Ms |= ψ. Note that the
valuation of atoms in v(ϕ) onM |ψ is also constant, and that it is the same as the valuation
of atoms on M . Consider the disjoint union M ′ = M +M |ψ of M and M |ψ (it is the
model defined by the disjoint union of the respective domains, accessibility relations, and
valuations). Like M and M |ψ, M ′ is a model on which the valuation of v(ϕ) is constant.
Therefore, from Lemma 3.8, eitherM ′ |= ϕ orM ′ |= ¬ϕ. The second implies thatM |= ¬ϕ
which contradicts Ms |= ϕ. Therefore, M
′ |= ϕ. From M ′ |= ϕ it follows that M |ψ |= ϕ,
so that in particular (M |ψ)s |= ϕ. As ψ was arbitrary, we now have shown that: for all
ψ ∈ L+el , if Ms |= ψ then (M |ψ)s |= ϕ. By the semantics of public announcement this is
equivalent to: for all ψ ∈ L+el , Ms |= [ψ]ϕ. By the semantics of + this is equivalent to
Ms |= +ϕ. From that and the assumption it follows that Ms |= ϕ → +ϕ, and as s was
arbitrary, we thus have shown that M |= ϕ→ +ϕ, as required. 
Given a model Ms and a (finite) set of propositional variables Q, we write δ
s
Q for the
conjunction of literals expressing the values of the atoms from Q in s. This is the so-called
characteristic formula of the (restricted) valuation in state s. Note that Ms |= δ
s
Q.
Proposition 3.10 Arbitrary positive announcements have the Church-Rosser property in
S5 , i.e. S5 |= 3++ϕ→ + 3+ϕ for all ϕ ∈ L
+
apal .
Proof Let Ms |= 3++ϕ. Then there is ψ ∈ L
+
el such that Ms |= 〈ψ〉+ϕ, i.e., Ms |= ψ
and (M |ψ)s |= +ϕ. In particular, (M |ψ)s |= [δ
s
v(ϕ)]ϕ. Therefore, since we also have that
Ms |= δ
s
v(ϕ), (M |ψ|δ
s
v(ϕ))s |= ϕ. Observe that M |ψ|δ
s
v(ϕ) is a model on which the valuation
of atoms in v(ϕ) is constant.
Now let η ∈ L+el be arbitrary and such that Ms |= η. Consider (M |η|δ
s
v(ϕ))s. The
valuation of the atoms in v(ϕ) is also constant on M |η|δsv(ϕ). From Lemma 3.8 it follows
that M |η|δsv(ϕ) |= ϕ or M |η|δ
s
v(ϕ) |= ¬ϕ. Similarly to the reasoning in the proof of Lemma
3.9, the latter contradicts (the above) (M |ψ|δsv(ϕ))s |= ϕ, and therefore M |η|δ
s
v(ϕ) |= ϕ.
From that follows (M |η)s |= 〈δ
s
v(ϕ)〉ϕ, so that (M |η)s |= 3+ϕ.
We have now shown that for all η ∈ L+el , Ms |= η implies (M |η)s |= 3+ϕ, which by the
semantics of + is equivalent to Ms |= + 3+ϕ. 
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Proposition 3.11 ([5, Prop. 3.4]) Arbitrary positive announcements have the McKin-
sey property in S5 , i.e. S5 |= + 3+ϕ→ 3++ϕ for all ϕ ∈ L
+
apal .
Proof The proof is different from that of Proposition 3.10, but the crucial role of the
announcement of values of all variables in ϕ is the same.
Suppose Ms |= + 3+ϕ. Then (as above) (M |δ
s
v(ϕ))s |= 3+ϕ. As M |δ
s
v(ϕ) is a model
on which the valuation of the atoms in v(ϕ) is constant, we have (Lemma 3.10) that
M |δsv(ϕ) |= ϕ → +ϕ. Also using the dual M |δ
s
v(ϕ) |= 3+ϕ → ϕ of that lemma, we obtain
M |δsv(ϕ) |= 3+ϕ → +ϕ. From that and (M |δ
s
v(ϕ))s |= 3+ϕ it follows that (M |δ
s
v(ϕ))s |= +ϕ,
and we therefore obtain Ms |= 〈δ
s
v(ϕ)〉+ϕ and also Ms |= 3++ϕ. 
Nowhere in the proofs of Lemma 3.7, Lemma 3.8, Proposition 3.11 and Proposition 3.10
is it essential that the announced formulas are positive. A closer comparison with the
results in [5] may therefore be of interest:
The proofs of Lemma 3.7 and Proposition 3.11 (McKinsey) are virtually identical to,
respectively, [5, Lemma 3.2] and [5, Prop. 3.4]. The proof of Lemma 3.8 is more detailed
than that of [5, Lemma 3.3], but it seems to amount to the intentions of that more schematic
proof. However, the proof of Proposition 3.10 (Church-Rosser) is very different from the
proof of [5, Prop. 3.8], that is not only more involved but also based on a lemma that was
later shown by Kuijer to be incorrect. We have therefore not attributed Proposition 3.10
to [5].
Again, we note that analogous results to Lemma 2.8 and Lemma 2.9 on bisimulation
correspondence also apply to the language L+apal : bisimilarity preserves modal equivalence
(APAL+ is bisimulation invariant), and on image-finite models modal equivalence implies
bisimilarity. As we also consider some variations, we will give the crucial detail to prove
the first.
Lemma 3.12 Let Ms ,M
′
s′ ∈ S5 . Then Ms ≃ M
′
s′ implies Ms ≡apal+ M
′
s′.
Proof We prove the equivalent proposition:
Let ϕ ∈ L+apal be a formula. Then for all epistemic models Ms ,M
′
s′ ∈ S5 such
that Ms ≃ M
′
s′, Ms |= ϕ if and only if M
′
s′ |= ϕ.
This is a straightforward proof by induction over the complexity of the formula ϕ occurring
the proposition (just as the proof in [1]), where it is important that this formula is declared
before the two models. The clause for +ϕ goes as follows.
Ms |= +ϕ
⇔
For all ψ ∈ L+el , Ms |= [ψ]ϕ
⇔
For all ψ ∈ L+el , Ms |= ψ implies (M |ψ)s |= ϕ
⇔ (*)
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For all ψ ∈ L+el , M
′
s′ |= ψ implies (M |ψ)s |= ϕ
⇔ (**)
For all ψ ∈ L+el , M
′
s′ |= ψ implies (M
′|ψ)s′ |= ϕ
⇔
For all ψ ∈ L+el , M
′
s′ |= [ψ]ϕ
⇔
M ′s′ |= +ϕ.
Step (*) is justified because Ms ≃ M
′
s′ implies Ms ≡el M
′
s′ (Lemma 2.8). Therefore,
Ms |= ψ iff M
′
s′ |= ψ.
Step (**) is justified as follows. Given the assumption Ms ≃ M
′
s′ , let R : Ms ≃ M
′
s′ .
Define R′ as follows: R′(t, t′) iff (R(t, t′) and Mt |= ψ). From Lemma 2.8 it follows that
also M ′t′ |= ψ, so that R
′ is indeed a relation between M |ψ and M ′|ψ. We now show that
R′ : (M |ψ)s ≃ (M
′|ψ)s′. The clause atoms-p is obviously satisfied. Concerning forth-a,
take any pair (t, t′) such that R′(t, t′) and let u in the domain of M |ψ be such that t ∼a u.
As u is in the domain of M |ψ, Mu |= ψ. From R
′(t, t′) follows R(t, t′). As t ∼a u in M |ψ,
also t ∼a u in M . From R(t, t
′), t ∼a u in M , and forth-a (for R) it follows that there
is u′ in the domain of M ′ such that R(u, u′) and t′ ∼a u
′. From R(u, u′), Mu |= ψ, and
Lemma 2.8 it follows that M ′u′ |= ψ, i.e., u
′ is also in the domain of M |ψ. From R(u, u′),
Mu |= ψ, and the fact the u
′ is in the domain of M |ψ it follows that R′(u, u′), as required.
This proves forth-a. The step back-a is shown similarly. Note that in particular R′(s, s′).
This therefore establishes that (M |ψ)s ≃ (M
′|ψ)s′.
We now use that the induction hypothesis for ϕ not merely holds for epistemic models
Ms,M
′
s′ , but for any pair of epistemic models Nt, N
′
t′ , so in particular for (M |ψ)s, (M
′|ψ)s′.
(In the formulation of the proposition to be proved, the formula is declared before the
models.) We thus conclude that (M |ψ)s |= ϕ iff (M
′|ψ)s′ |= ϕ, as required. 
The above lemma is the analogue of bisimulation invariance for epistemic logic (Lemma
2.8). This analogue does not hold for APAL+ when we replace bisimulations with Q-
bisimulations. This is because in the formula +ϕ, the positive announcements can range
over atoms that do not appear in ϕ. It similarly fails for the logic APAL; see the discussion
at the end of Subsection 2.3.
We end this section with a fairly obvious result for compactness, that is similarly
obtained for APAL+ as for APAL.
A logic with language L is compact if for any Φ ⊆ L , if every finite Φ′ ⊆ Φ is satisfiable,
then Φ is satisfiable. Like APAL, APAL+ is not compact.
Proposition 3.13 APAL+ is not compact.
This follows from the same reasoning used by Balbiani et al. [5] to show that APAL is
not compact. Specifically, under the semantics of APAL+ the set of formulas {[ψ](Kap→
KbKap) | ψ ∈ L
+
el } ∪ {¬+ (Kap → KbKap)} is unsatisfiable but every finite subset is
satisfiable. (The only difference with the proof in [5] is that instead of ‘ψ ∈ L+el ’ above it
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there says ‘ψ ∈ Lel ’.) Any finite subset is satisfiable because the epistemic depth of such a
set {[ψ](Kap→ KbKap) | ψ ∈ L
+
el } is bounded (or, alternatively, because there must be an
atom q ∈ P not occurring in such a set). We then proceed fairly similarly as in the proof
of Proposition 2.16.
4 Model Checking Complexity
We now address the model checking complexity for APAL+. In this section we will assume
that we are working with a finite fragment of the language (so A and P are finite sets)
and finite models M = (S,∼, V ) (where S is finite). The model checking problem for
APAL+, for which we write MC(APAL+), is as follows: given a finite pointed model Ms
and ϕ ∈ L+apal , determine whether Ms |= ϕ. The model checking problem for APAL
+ is
PSPACE-complete. We adapt the proof given for the PSPACE-complete model checking
complexity for GAL, by A˚gotnes et al. [1, Theorems 24 & 25]. We note that APAL model
checking is also PSPACE-complete, which was shown in [1, p. 74] by an even simpler
adaptation of the proof for GAL than our adaptation for APAL+.
Lemma 4.1 Let M = (S,∼, V ),M ′ = (S ′,∼′, V ′) ∈ S5 be finite epistemic models. Given
that a refinement from M to M ′ exists, there is a unique, maximal refinement R ⊆ S ×S ′
from M to M ′ and it is computable in polynomial time.
Proof This follows from similar reasoning used to show that the unique, maximal bisimu-
lation between two models is computable in polynomial time, defining the refinement as a
greatest fixed point of a monotone function, however relaxing the forth condition appro-
priately. Specifically, we define the function f : ℘(S × S ′) −→ ℘(S × S ′) by (s, s′) ∈ f(R)
if and only if:
• (s, s′) ∈ R;
• for all p ∈ P , s ∈ V (p) if and only if s′ ∈ V ′(p);
• for all a ∈ A, for every t′ ∼′a s
′, there exists t ∼a s such that (t, t
′) ∈ R;
It is clear that the function is monotone (i.e., if R ⊆ R′, then f(R) ⊆ f(R′)), and that
any non-empty fixed point of this function is a refinement. Furthermore, every refinement,
R from M to M ′, is a fixed point of f . Therefore, the greatest fixed point will be a unique
maximal refinement. The function f can be computed in polynomial time, and at most
|S| · |S ′| iterations will be required to reach a fixed point, so the maximal refinement is
computable in polynomial time. 
Theorem 4.2 MC(APAL+) is in PSPACE.
Proof We adapt an alternating polynomial time (APTIME) model-checking algorithm
used forGAL [1, Algorithm 1, p. 74]. The main variation required is that we must be able to
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Algorithm 1 sat(M, s, ϕ)
from M compute RM ;
case ϕ of
(·) p: if s ∈ V (p) then accept else reject;
(·) ¬p: if s ∈ V (p) then reject else accept;
(∀) ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2: choose ϕ
′ ∈ {ϕ1, ϕ2}; sat(M, s, ϕ
′);
(∃) ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2: choose ϕ
′ ∈ {ϕ1, ϕ2}; sat(M, s, ϕ
′);
(∀) Kaϕ
′: choose t ∼a s; sat(M, t, ϕ
′);
(∃) Laϕ
′: choose t ∼a s; sat(M, t, ϕ
′);
(∀) [ϕ1]ϕ2: choose a restriction M
′ = (S ′,∼′, V ′) of M ;
if for some s′ ∈ S ′, not sat(M, s′, ϕ1) then accept
else if for some s′ ∈ S \ S ′, sat(M, s′, ϕ1) then accept
else if s /∈ S ′ then accept else sat(M ′, s, ϕ2);
(∃) 〈ϕ1〉ϕ2: choose a restriction M
′ = (S ′,∼′, V ′) of M ;
if for some s′ ∈ S ′, not sat(M, s′, ϕ1) then reject
else if for some s′ ∈ S \ S ′, sat(M, s′, ϕ1) then reject
else if s /∈ S ′ then reject else sat(M ′, s, ϕ2);
(∀) +ϕ: Choose any restriction M ′ = (S ′,∼′, V ′) of M such that
for all t ∈ S ′, for all t′ where (t, t′) ∈ RM , we have t′ ∈ S ′
if s ∈ S ′ then sat(M ′, s, ϕ) else accept;
(∃) 3+ϕ: Choose any restriction M ′ = (S ′,∼′, V ′) of M such that
for all t ∈ S ′, for all t′ where (t, t′) ∈ RM , we have t′ ∈ S ′
if s ∈ S ′ then sat(M ′, s, ϕ) else reject;
end case
test whether a submodel can be defined by a positive announcement. From Proposition 3.4
and Proposition 3.5 it follows that, in order for a restriction of a finite model to be definable
as the result of a positive announcement, it must be closed under refinements. From
Lemma 4.1 we can check that this condition is satisfied by first computing in polynomial
time the maximal refinement fromM to itself, RM , and then using this refinement to select
only refinement preserving restrictions of the model.
We now present the algorithm, sat, for model-checking in APAL+. The algorithm sat
takes as input a finite model M = (S,∼, V ), some s ∈ S and a formula ϕ ∈ L+apal that
we require to be in what is known as negation normal form. This means that the formula
conforms to the syntax ϕ ::= p | ¬p | ϕ∧ϕ | ϕ∨ϕ | Kaϕ | Laϕ | [ϕ]ϕ | 〈ϕ〉ϕ | +ϕ | 3+ϕ. It
is clear that all formulas are semantically equivalent to a formula in negation normal form.
A run of the algorithm halts with either accept or reject. Each case of the algorithm
is either existential or universal, where for an existential case to be accepting, one choice
must lead to an accepting case, and for a universal case to be accepting, every choice must
lead to an accepting case. The algorithm is presented as Algorithm 1.
The proof of correctness follows the inductive argument presented in [1]: we can show
that sat(M, s, ϕ) accepts if and only if Ms |= ϕ by induction over the complexity of
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ϕ. The correctness of the (∀)+ϕ and (∃)3+ϕ cases follows directly from Proposition 3.4,
Proposition 3.5 and Lemma 4.1, as mentioned above. In particular, the (∀)+ϕ and (∃)3+ϕ
cases in Algorithm 1 can be shown to match the semantic interpretation of the + and 3+
operators respectively. Focusing on the 3+ case, if there is a positive announcement α such
that (M |α)s |= ϕ, then there is some restriction M
′ = (S ′,∼′, V ′) of M such that s ∈ S ′,
M ′s |= ϕ, and for all t, t
′ ∈ S such that Mt  Mt′ , if t ∈ S
′ then t′ ∈ S ′. Applying the
inductive hypothesis, choosing such a restriction will lead to an accepting run. Conversely,
if there is some restriction satisfying these properties, from Lemma 3.4, there must be some
corresponding positive announcement α that realises this refinement. Again, applying the
inductive hypothesis we have (M |α)s |= ϕ and hence Ms |= 3+α. The case for + is treated
in a similar manner.
Since sat can be implemented in polynomial time, MC(APAL+) is in APTIME, which
is equivalent to PSPACE [10]. 
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Figure 4: The model MΨ used to encode the quantified boolean formula Ψ. The agent’s
relation is universal, so it is the transitive closure of the depicted relation.
Theorem 4.3 MC(APAL+) is PSPACE-hard.
Proof This follows from similar reasoning used to show that MC(GAL) is PSPACE-
hard, [1]. The basic approach is to show that instances of the QBF-SAT problem can
be solved through model-checking a L+apal formula on an appropriately constructed model.
A quantified boolean formula may be given as Ψ = Q1x1 . . . Qkxkϕ(x1, . . . , xk), where
Qi ∈ {∀, ∃}, x1, . . . , xk are propositional variables, and ϕ(x1, . . . , xk) is a boolean formula.
(Following custom in QBF-SAT, the variables are not named p1, . . . , pn but x1, . . . , xn
instead.) The notation ϕ(x1, . . . , xk) means that each variable x1, . . . , xk binds to all its
occurrences, possibly none, in ϕ. For 1 ≤ n ≤ k, we will use the abbreviation Ψn =
Qnxn . . . Qkxkϕ(x1, . . . , xk) to represent the fragment of Ψ where x1, . . . , xn−1 (if n = 1
none at all) are unquantified.
The satisfiability problem for quantified boolean problems (QBF-SAT) is well-known
to be the canonical problem for PSPACE-completeness. Given any quantified boolean
formula Ψ, we can construct a model, MΨs , and a APAL
+ formula, ψ, such that MΨs |= ψ
if and only if Ψ is satisfiable.
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The model MΨ = (S,∼, V ) is specified with respect to a set of atoms {x+i , x
−
i | 1 ≤
i ≤ k}, an additional auxiliary variable x0, and a single agent. The model represents
each boolean variable xi for 1 ≤ i ≤ k by a pair of states (si, 0) and (si, 1), so we let
S = {s1, . . . , sk} × {0, 1} ∪ {s}, including the s state as designated state from which to
evaluate the formula. The single agent with a universal relation is unable to distinguish
any state, so ∼ = S × S. Finally we have V (x+i ) = {(si, 1)} and V (x
−
i ) = {(si, 0)}, and
V (x0) = {s}. The model is depicted in Figure 4.
We are then able to encode the satisfiability of Ψ = Q1x1 . . . Qkxkϕ(x1, . . . , xk) induc-
tively. We assume that ϕ(x1, . . . , xk) is in disjunctive normal form. For each i from 1 to
k we define the formulas Xi = Ljx
+
i , X i = Ljx
−
i , Ui = Xi ∧ Xi and Di = Xi ↔ ¬X i,
for, respectively: Xi is true, Xi is false, Xi is undetermined and Xi is determined. Addi-
tionally, U0 represents Ljx0. As the base case of the induction we have f(ϕ(x1, . . . , xk)) =
U0 ∧
∧k
i=1Di ∧ ϕ(X1, . . . , Xk), that may be satisfied by some restriction of M
Ψ, as in
Figure 5.
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. . . (sk, 1)
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MΨ:
Figure 5: A restriction of MΨ satisfying f(¬x1 ∧ x2 ∧ xk)
.
We have two inductive cases, for Qn = ∀ and Qn = ∃. If Qn = ∀, then
f(Ψn) = +
((
U0 ∧
n∧
i=1
Di ∧
k∧
i=n+1
Ui
)
→ f(Ψn+1)
)
.
If Qn = ∃, then
f(Ψn) = 3+
(
U0 ∧
n∧
i=1
Di ∧
k∧
i=n+1
Ui ∧ f(Ψ
n+1)
)
.
The boolean quantifier Qi is simulated using a 3+ or + operator, appropriately guarded so
that it removes precisely one of (si, 0) and (si, 1) from the model, and does not affect any of
the other states. This is achieved by the subformulas:
∧n
i=1Di, which requires either (si, 0)
or (si, 1) to remain in the restriction, for i = 1 . . . n; and
∧k
i=n+1 Ui which requires both
(si, 0) and (si, 1) to remain in the restriction for i = n + 1 . . . k. Since the model is finite,
and each state has a unique evaluation, this can always be achieved by a positive public
announcement. After all the quantifiers have been applied in turn, we able to interpret
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the boolean formula ϕ, by checking which states remain. The encoding of this formula
and the constructed model are polynomial in the size of Ψ, so model-checking APAL+ is
PSPACE-hard. A more extensive discussion of the construction and proof can be found in
[1]. 
5 Expressivity
5.1 The relative expressivity of APAL+ and PAL
In this section we establish various expressivity results, mainly that (for more than one
agent) APAL+ is more expressive than S5 (or PAL), which is obvious, and that APAL+
and APAL are incomparable, which is not obvious.
Proposition 5.1 Arbitrary positive announcement logic is as expressive as public an-
nouncement logic in S5 for a single agent.
Proof We recall that single-agent APAL is as expressive as S5 [5, Prop. 3.11 and 3.12].
The same proof applies to single-agent APAL+: it plays no role anywhere in the proof in
[5] whether the announcement witnessing an APAL quantifier is an epistemic formula or a
positive epistemic formula. 
Proposition 5.2 Arbitrary positive announcement logic is (strictly) more expressive than
public announcement logic in S5 for more than one agent.
Proof We refer to the proof of Proposition 2.16. Observe that the announcement q used
in that proof is a positive formula. Therefore, this also shows that no epistemic formula is
equivalent to the L+apal formula 3+ (Kap ∧ ¬KbKap). 
5.2 APAL+ is not at least as expressive as APAL
We now consider the relative expressivity of APAL and APAL+. In this subsection we
show in Theorem 5.11, further below, that APAL+ is not at least as expressive as APAL
for multiple agents, by the standard method of providing two pointed epistemic models
and a formula (in Lapal ) such that the models can be distinguished by that formula but
cannot be distinguished by any formula in the other language (in L+apal ). The theorem and
its proof are preceded by the definition of the respective models and by various lemmas to
be used in that proof. The next subsection is devoted to the other direction of expressivity,
namely that APAL is not at least as expressive as APAL+ for multiple agents. From these
two results we can then conclude that APAL+ and APAL are incomparable in expressivity.
Consider the models Mω0 and M
m
0 in Figure 6. We will use these two epistemic models
in the expressivity result of this section. They are both a-b-chains. We first define the
base model, Mω . Formally Mω = (S,∼, V ) where S = N ∪ N′ (where N′ = {i′ | i ∈ N}),
∼a is the symmetric and reflexive closure of {(2i, 2i+ 1), (2i
′, (2i+ 1)′) | i ∈ N}, ∼b is the
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Figure 6: Models Mω0 and M
m
0 used in the proof of Theorem 5.11.
symmetric and reflexive closure of {(2i+ 1, 2i+ 2), ((2i+ 1)′, (2i+ 2)′) | i ∈ N} ∪ {(0, 0′)},
and V (p) = {s, s′}.
We define an ordering  over the states of S∪{ω, ω′} as follows. This use of the symbol
 is different from that for models in the refinement relation and is therefore unambiguous.
x  y iff


x ∈ N and y = ω
x, y ∈ N and x ≤ y,
x, y ∈ N′, x = w′, y = z′, and w ≥ z,
x = ω′ and y ∈ N′, or
x ∈ N′ ∪ {ω′} and y ∈ N ∪ {ω}
For convenience, in this proof we will denote the set Syx = {z ∈ S | x  z  y} where
x, y ∈ N∪{ω, ω′}. Form ∈ N, Mm0 will be used as an abbreviation for the model (M |S
ω
m′)0,
as depicted in Figure 6. We will show that no formula of APAL+ can distinguish the set of
models {Mm0 | m ∈ N} from the set of models {M
m
0 | m ∈ N} ∪ {M
ω
0 }, while the sets are
distinguishable in APAL. The assumption that such a distinguishing APAL+ formula exists
is contradictory, as it must then in particular be true in Mm0 for some m ∈ N sufficiently
large, in which case we can show that it must also be true in Mω0 .
Models Mm0 and M
ω
0 in Figure 6 are the same except that in M
m
s the lower leg is cut
off at the world named m′. As m is arbitrary, the final indistinguishability link between
(m − 1)′ and m′ could be for b or for a. In subsequent proofs we assume without loss of
generality that it is a b-link and that (therefore) m ≥ 2 is even.
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Lemma 5.3 The edge state m′ of model Mm can be distinguished by an epistemic formula.
Proof We show that the state m′ in Mm is the unique point satisfying the formula
KaL
m
baKbp ∧ ¬L
m−1
ba Kbp (see Lemma 2.12 for notation).
We can see this as follows. The denotation of Kbp is {0, 0
′}. Therefore, the denotation
of LaKbp is {0, 0
′, 1, 1′}, and the denotation of LbLaKbp is {0, 0
′, 1, 1′, 2, 2′}, and in general
the denotation of any LkbaKbp for k ≤ m is {0, 0
′, . . . , k − 1, (k − 1)′, k, k′}. In particular,
the denotation of LmbaKbp is {0, 0
′, . . . , m− 1, (m− 1)′, m,m′}.
Then, asm′ is an edge state, the denotation ofKaL
m
baKbp is {0, 0
′, . . . , m−1, (m−1)′, m′}
(so, without state m), as in state m agent a considers a state m+1 possible (where LmbaKbp
is false), but in the edge m′ agent a does not consider another state possible.
Next, the denotation of ¬Lm−1ba Kbp is the complement of {0, 0
′, . . . , m − 1, (m − 1)′},
i.e., {m,m′, m+ 1, m+ 2, . . . }. The denotation of the conjunction
δm′ := KaL
m
baKbp ∧ ¬L
m−1
ba Kbp
of these two formulas is the intersection of these two sets: {0, 0′, . . . , m− 1, (m− 1)′, m′}∩
{m,m′, m+ 1, m+ 2, . . . } = {m′}, as required.
This shows that m′ has a distinguishing formula δm′ . 
Lemma 5.4 Mm0 6|= 2(KbKap ∨Kb¬Kap)
Proof As edge state m′ of model Mm has a distinguishing formula, it follows from
Lemma 2.13 that any finite subset T ⊆ S of model Mm has a distinguishing formula.
In particular, we can therefore distinguish the set T = {0, 0′, 1′}. Let formula δT ∈ Lel be
such that Mm0 |= δT and [[δT ]]Mm = {0, 0
′, 1′}. Note that (Mm|δT )0 6|= KbKap ∨ Kb¬Kap.
Therefore, Mm0 6|= 2(KbKap ∨Kb¬Kap). 
As an example of the Lemmas 5.3 and 5.4, consider model M2. The distinguishing
formula of world 2′ is δ2′ = KaLbLaKbp∧¬LaKbp, and the submodel consisting of domain
{0, 0′, 1}, using the method of Lemma 2.13, has distinguishing formula (Lbδ2′ ∧ ¬δ2′) ∨
(LaLbδ2′ ∧¬Lbδ2′)∨ (LbLaLbδ2′ ∧¬LaLbδ2′), which is equivalent to LbLaLbδ2′ ∧¬δ2′ , i.e., to
LbLaLb(KaLbLaKbp ∧ ¬LaKbp) ∧ ¬(KaLbLaKbp ∧ ¬LaKbp).
Similarly, we thus obtain that δT in the proof of Lemma 5.4 is equivalent to the formula
Lm+2ab (KaL
m+1
ba Kbp ∧ ¬L
m
baKbp) ∧ ¬L
m−1
ab (KaL
m+1
ba Kbp ∧ ¬L
m
baKbp).
Lemma 5.5 Mω0 |= 2(KbKap ∨Kb¬Kap)
Proof Consider the relation R on Mω defined as the symmetric closure of {(i, i′) | i ∈ N}.
It is obvious that this relation R is a bisimulation (and even an isomorphism). Differently
said, the 0, 1, . . . chain is the mirror image of the 0′, 1′, . . . chain. Therefore, Mω0 |=
2(KbKap∨Kb¬Kap): firstly, any announcement must preserve actual state 0 and therefore
also preserves the bisimilar 0′; secondly, either 1 and the bisimilar 1′ are both eliminated
by an announcement, after which KbKap is true at 0, or 1 and 1
′ are both preserved, after
which Kb¬Kap is true at 0. 
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We continue by preparing the ground for the result that Mω and Mm cannot be dis-
tinguished in L+apal by a formula of epistemic depth at most m. The main observation
required for this result, is that given the very sparse structure of the model Mω, there are
only three meaningful positive announcements. We can show this by looking in detail at
the maximal refinements on Mω and some of its restrictions.
Lemma 5.6 Consider the relation R on Mω consisting of: (0, 0′), (0′, 0), and all pairs
(i, j), (i, j′), (i′, j), and (i′, j′) such that i, j ∈ N, i, j > 0, and i ≤ j. Then R is a
refinement.
Proof The atoms-p requirement is satisfied as all pairs in the relation only relate states
wherein p is true in both ((0, 0′) and (0′, 0)) or wherein p is false in both (all other pairs).
For back-a, let (i, j′) ∈ R for i, j ∈ N with i, j > 0 and suppose j′ ∼a k
′. We need to
consider several cases:
• if k = j − 1 and j = 1, then: i = 1 and k′ = 0′ and as 0 ∼a 1 we choose (0, 0
′) ∈ R;
• if k = j − 1 and j 6= 1, then: if i ≤ j − 1 then (i, (j − 1)′) ∈ R else i− 1 ≤ j − 1 and
(i− 1) ∼a i so (i− 1, (j − 1)
′) ∈ R;
• if k = j, then (choose i ∼a i and) (i, j
′) ∈ R;
• if k = j + 1, then i ≤ j implies i ≤ j + 1 so (i, (j + 1)′) ∈ R.
The cases where (i, j), (i′, j′), (i′, j) ∈ R are similar, and the clause back-b can also be
similarly proved. We further note that R is the maximal refinement on Mω . 
The proof of Lemma 5.6 also holds for certain connected submodels ofMω such that 0 or
0′ and 1 or 1′ are in the connected part Syx . We recall the order  defined on N∪N
′∪{ω, ω′}.
These cases are needed in Lemma 5.8. (The submodels only containing 0 or 0′, or only
excluding 0 and 0′, are less of interest, as shown in Lemma 5.8.)
Corollary 5.7 Let R′ be the restriction of R to Syx for some x, y ∈ S ∪ {ω, ω}, where
S = D(Mω).
1. if x  1′ and 1  y then R′ is a refinement on Mω|Syx.
2. if x = 0 then R′ is a refinement on Mω|Syx.
3. if x = 0′ and 1  y then R′ \ {(0′, 0)} is a refinement on Mω|Syx.
4. if x  1′ and y = 0 then R′ \ {(0, 0′)} is a refinement on Mω|Syx.
5. if y = 0′ then R′ is a refinement on Mω|Syx.
In the second item above the pair (0′, 0) is now excluded because back-a fails, as the link
0 ∼a 1 cannot be matched in state 0
′, wherein only 0′ ∼a 0
′. In the third item above the
pair (0, 0′) is now excluded because the link 0′ ∼a 1
′ cannot be matched in state 0.
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Lemma 5.8 Let ϕ ∈ L+el , N be any submodel of M
ω and t ∈ D(N). Then we have either
(N |ϕ)t ≃ (N |p)t, or (N |ϕ)t ≃ (N |¬p)t, or (N |ϕ)t ≃ Nt.
Proof For the purposes of bisimulation it is sufficient to consider the connected component
containing t after the announcement of ϕ. As the model is an a-b-chain this connected
component will be a model (Mω|Syx)t for some t ∈ S and x, y ∈ S ∪{ω, ω
′} with x  t  y.
Then we have the following cases:
1. If x = 0′ and y = 0 (or x = y = 0, or x = y = 0′), then p is true everywhere, and
the connected component is bisimilar to a singleton model wherein p is true. An
announcement of p suffices here, so (N |ϕ)t ≃ (N |p)t.
2. If x, y ∈ N\{0} or x, y ∈ N′\{0′}, then p is false everywhere. An announcement of ¬p
will equally result in a model restriction only containing ¬p states. Both restrictions
are bisimilar to a singleton model wherein p is false, so (N |ϕ)t ≃ (N |¬p)t.
3. Finally, as we are in a connected component, if neither of the above cases are true,
then we must have in our connected model a state i ∈ {0, 0′} and a state j ∈ {1, 1′}
that were preserved by the announcement of ϕ. Now for every k ∈ D(N) where
k ∈ (N \ {0})∪ (N′ \ {0′}) we have Nk is a refinement of Nj (Corollary 5.7), so every
such k must have been preserved by the announcement of ϕ (Lemma 2.23). Further:
• if j = 1 and i = 0′ so that 0 is also in (N |ϕ), then N0′ is a refinement of N0
(Corollary 5.7.3) so that both 0 and 0′ are preserved;
• if i = 0 and j = 1′ so that 0′ is also in (N |ϕ), then N0 is a refinement of N0′
(Corollary 5.7.4) so that again both 0 and 0′ are preserved;
• if i = 0′ but 0 is not in (N |ϕ), then 0′ was preserved by assumption;
• if i = 0 but 0′ is not in (N |ϕ), then 0 was preserved by assumption.
Therefore every state in the connected component containing t is preserved by ϕ and
(N |ϕ)t ≃ Nt.

Lemma 5.9 Let M,N be submodels of Mω, s ∈ D(M), t ∈ D(N), and k ∈ N. If
Ms ≃
k Nt, then Ms ≡
k
apal+ Nt.
Proof By induction on ϕ we show the equivalent proposition:
Let ϕ ∈ L+apal , M,N be submodels of M
ω, s ∈ D(M), t ∈ D(N), and d(ϕ) ≤ k
where k ∈ N. If Ms ≃
k Nt, then Ms |= ϕ iff Nt |= ϕ.
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We only show the relevant cases Kaϕ, [ψ]ϕ, and +ϕ. As k-bisimilarity is a symmetric
relation it suffices to show just one direction for each case. Let R0 ⊇ · · · ⊇ Rk be such
that R0 : Ms ≃
0 Nt, . . . , R
k : Ms ≃
k Nt.
Case Kaϕ: Suppose d(Kaϕ) ≤ k. We have Ms |= Kaϕ if and only if for all s
′ ∼a s,
Ms′ |= ϕ. As R
k : Ms ≃
k Nt, for all t
′ ∼a t there is some s
′ ∼a s such that R
k−1 :Ms′ ≃
k−1
Nt′ . By the induction hypothesis we have for all ψ where d(ψ) ≤ k − 1, Ms′ |= ψ implies
Nt′ |= ψ. As d(ϕ) ≤ k − 1, it follows that for all t
′ ∼a t, Nt′ |= ϕ. Therefore Nt |= Kaϕ.
Case [ψ]ϕ: Suppose d([ψ]ϕ) ≤ k, and Ms |= [ψ]ϕ. By the definition of d we may
suppose that d(ψ) = i and d(ϕ) = j where i+j ≤ k. For all (s′, t′) ∈ Ri, we haveMs′ ≃
i Nt′ ,
so by the induction hypothesis, Ms′ |= ψ if and only if Nt′ |= ψ. Therefore, if Ms 6|= ψ then
Nt 6|= ψ and vacuously Nt |= [ψ]ϕ, as required. Suppose now that Ms |= ψ. We define the
series of relations from (M |ψ) to (N |ψ) for ℓ = 0, . . . , j: Qℓ = {(s′, t′) ∈ Rk−ℓ | Ms′ |= ψ}.
Note that as (s′, t′) ∈ Qj implies (s′, t′) ∈ Ri, it follows that Nt′ |= ψ.
We now show that the clauses atoms, forth and back of bounded bisimulation (Defi-
nition 2.5) hold for Qn = Q0, . . . ,Qj .
Case n = 0. We show atoms-p, for p ∈ P . From Rk : Ms ≃
k Nt and R
0 ⊇ Rk follows
R0 : Ms ≃
0 Nt, i.e., s and t satisfy the same atoms and therefore the same Booleans.
From R0 :Ms ≃
0 Nt and Ms |= ψ, and the observation above that Nt |= ψ, follows by the
definition of Q0 that Q0 : (M |ψ)s ≃
0 (N |ψ)t, i.e., R
n
ϕ : (M |ψ)s ≃
n (N |ψ)t.
Case n > 0. We show j-forth-a. Let s ∼a s
′ andMs′ |= ψ (i.e., s ∼a s
′ in (M |ψ)). From
Rk : Ms ≃
k Nt and s ∼a s
′ follows that there is a t′ ∼a t such that R
k−1 : Ms′ ≃
k−1 Nt′ .
As j > 0, d(ψ) < k, i.e., d(ψ) ≤ k − 1. From Rk−1 : Ms′ ≃
k−1 Nt′ , Ms′ |= ψ and
d(ψ) ≤ k − 1 it follows by bisimulation invariance (Lemma 2.11) that Nt′ |= ψ. Therefore
t′ is in the domain of N |ψ. By induction, from Rk−1 : Ms′ ≃
k−1 Nt′ it follows that
Qj−1 : (M |ψ)s′ ≃
j−1 (N |ψ)t′ . Therefore, t
′ satisfies the requirement for j-forth-a for
relation Qj . The clause j-back-a is shown similarly. Therefore (M |ψ)s ≃
j (N |ψ)t, so
applying the induction hypothesis once again, we have (M |ψ)s |= ϕ implies (N |ψ)t |= ϕ,
and so Nt |= [ψ]ϕ.
Case +ϕ: Suppose d(+ϕ) ≤ k, and Ms |= +ϕ. Then Ms |= [ψ]ϕ for all ψ ∈ L
+
el . Now
for any ψ ∈ L+el , by Corollary 5.8 we have either: (N |ψ)t ≃ (N |p)t, (N |ψ)t ≃ (N |¬p)t or
(N |ψ)t ≃ Nt.
1. In the first case, since Ms ≃
k Nt, Nt |= p implies Ms |= p so both (M |p)s and
(N |p)t are bisimilar to the singleton model where p is true. As Ms |= +ϕ, we have
(M |p)s |= ϕ and thus (N |p)t |= ϕ (Lemma 3.12). Since (N |p)t ≃ (N |ψ)t we have
Nu |= [ψ]ϕ.
2. The second case is similar: if (N |ψ)t ≃ (N |¬p)t, then Nt |= ¬p implies Ms |= ¬p.
We then have that (M |¬p)s and (N |¬p)t are bisimilar to the singleton model where
p is false, and thus (M |p)s |= ϕ implies (N |p)t |= ϕ. It follows that Nt |= [ψ]ϕ.
3. Finally, if (N |ψ)t ≃ Nt then since Ms ≃
k Nt and Ms |= [⊤]ϕ, we have Ms |= ϕ and
Nt |= ϕ by the induction hypothesis. Therefore (N |ψ)t |= ϕ and Nt |= [ψ]ϕ.
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Therefore, for every ψ ∈ L+el , Nt |= [ψ]ϕ, so Nt |= +ϕ as required. 
As Mm0 ≃
m Mω0 , the following corollary is rather a special case of the previous lemma.
Corollary 5.10 Let ϕ ∈ L+apal such that d(ϕ) ≤ m. Then M
m
0 |= ϕ iff M
ω
0 |= ϕ.
Theorem 5.11 APAL+ is not at least as expressive as APAL for multiple agents.
Proof Recall the Lapal formula 2(KbKap ∨ Kb¬Kap) from Lemmas 5.4 and 5.5. Let us
assume that there is an equivalent formula ϕ ∈ L+apal and the epistemic depth of this
formula is d(ϕ) = m. We recall that the epistemic depth counts the number of stacked
knowledge modalities, but ignores the arbitrary (positive) announcement modalities.
Consider again the models Mm0 and M
ω
0 of Figure 6. We have shown the following:
1. Mm0 6|= 2(KbKap ∨Kb¬Kap) (Lemma 5.4)
2. Mω0 |= 2(KbKap ∨Kb¬Kap) (Lemma 5.5)
3. Mm0 |= ϕ iff M
ω
0 |= ϕ (Corollary 5.10)
The assumption that 2(KbKap∨Kb¬Kap) is equivalent to ϕ is in contradiction with these
results. Therefore, no such equivalent ϕ exists. 
5.3 APAL is not at least as expressive as APAL+
We wish to establish incomparability of APAL and APAL+, so it remains to show that
APAL is not at least as expressive as APAL+ for multiple agents. This we will do in the
following Theorem 5.19, by, again, the standard method of providing two pointed epistemic
models and a formula (in L+apal ) such that the models can be distinguished by that formula
but cannot be distinguished by any formula in the other language (in Lapal ). Before that
theorem we will introduce the models used in its proof, present an intuitive example to
illustrate the proof method, and introduce some lemmas to be used in that proof.
Consider models M l0 and N
r
0 in Figure 7. Both are a-b-chains, and such that a variable
p is false in the evaluation point 0 and the values of p are swapped in adjoining states.
However, the model M l terminates on the a-link side of the designated state 0 in state l
(for left) and is infinite on b-link side of 0, whereas the model N r terminates on the b-link
side of 0 in state r (for right) and is infinite on the left.
Formally, let l be a negative odd integer and let r be a positive even integer, then the
domain ofM l is {i | i ∈ Z, i ≥ l}. Relation Ra in M
l is the symmetric and reflexive closure
of {(2i− 1, 2i) | i ∈ Z, 2i − 1 ≥ l}, whereas Rb is the symmetric and reflexive closure of
{(2i, 2i+ 1) | i ∈ Z, 2i > l}, and V (p) = {2i+ 1 | i ∈ Z, 2i+ 1 ≥ l}. Then, the domain of
N r is {i | i ∈ Z, i ≤ r}; the relations and valuation in N r are similarly defined as in M l.
We recall that M l and N r are a-b-chains. Both have a single edge.
In order to informally explain the method in the subsequent proof, first consider models
M−10 and N
2
0 in Figure 8. In M
−1 but not in N2, from the evaluation point 0, the a-link
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Figure 7: Models used in the proof of Theorem 5.19
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Figure 8: An example for l = −1 and r = 2
is closer to the edge than the b-link. The formula + (Lbp → Lap) formalizes this property
in L+apal .
InM−1, the prefixes of this chain are defined by the (positive) formulas: Kbp (for {−1}),
Ka(¬p ∨Kbp) (for {−1, 0}), Kb(p ∨Ka(¬p ∨Kbp)) (for {−1, 0, 1}), etc. As we build these
prefixes from the left, the a-link from 0 is included before the b-link from 0 is included.
There are yet other positively definable subsets containing 0, such as the ¬p-states. But
that cuts off both links. Differently said, if the b-link is included then the a-link is included.
And both have a different value of p than in 0. This gives us Lbp → Lap. And therefore,
M−10 |= + (Lbp→ Lap).
Now look at N2. There, similar reasoning makes us conclude that the b-link is always
included before the a-link. So we can make a positive announcement, namely Kb(¬p ∨
Ka(p ∨Kb¬p)), resulting in the restriction to {0, 1, 2}, after which Lbp is true but Lap is
false. So N20 6|= + (Lbp→ Lap).
Of course the models M−10 and N
2
0 can be easily distinguished in Lapal too. They can
even be distinguished in Lel , without APAL quantifiers, for example by a formula expressing
that the distance to the edge is 1 in M−10 but more than 1 in N
2
t . As Kbp distinguishes
state −1 in M , this formula is LaKbp. We note that M
−1
0 |= LaKbp whereas N
2
0 6|= LaKbp.
But, tellingly, you need to have that distance explicitly in the formula, unlike in the L+apal
formula. And d(LaKbp) = 2, larger than d(+ (Lbp→ Lap)) = 1.
Having prepared the ground for the proof, we now present Theorem 5.19 (at the end
of this section) and preceding lemmas.
Lemma 5.12 The positively definable restrictions of M l are: all states, the p-states, the
¬p-states, any finite prefix of the a-b-chain M l, and the union or intersection of any of the
previous.
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Proof The relation R := {(i+ 2j, i) | j ∈ N, i ∈ Z, i ≥ l} is the maximal refinement on
M l. It is a refinement because M li+2j  M
l
i iff M
l
i is isomorphic to a submodel of M
l
i+2j .
A submodel is the most typical example of the structural loss represented by a refinement.
The relation R is also maximal. We cannot pair, for example, a p-state to a ‘larger’ p-
state, such as in (l, l + 2): back-b would then fail: from l + 2 we can reach a ¬p-state via
l+1 ∼b l+2, but we cannot reach a ¬p-state by a b-link from state l. Similarly we cannot
have any other pair where the second argument is a state named with a bigger number
than the first argument, by iterating back steps.
Given R, the subsets of the domain of M l that are closed under refinement are: all
states, the p-states, the ¬p-states, and the finite prefixes of the chain M l. To this we
further add the union or intersection of any of the previous, where we note that the union
of two prefixes is the longer prefix and the intersection of two prefixes is the smaller prefix.
This means that also closed under refinement are: the p-states of any finite prefix, the
¬p-states of any finite prefix, and a prefix of the chain contained by a set of p-states, or
¬p-states, of a larger prefix (such as the set {−1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9}).
We now show that all refinement closed subsets of the domain of M l are positively
definable. This is not evident, as the domain of M l is not finite (so Lemma 3.5 does not
apply). We define: δll := Kbp, δ
l
i+1 := Ka(¬p ∨ δ
l
i) for i an odd natural number, and
δli+1 := Kb(p ∨ δ
l
i) for i an even natural number. The other positive formulas defining
refinement closed subsets are conjunctions or disjunctions of the previous; none of those
however will play a role in the continuation. 
The argument is the same for the model N r. In this case relation R′ := {(i− 2j, i) | j ∈
N, i ∈ Z, i ≤ r} is the maximal refinement on N r, and any N ri is isomorphic to a submodel
of N ri−2j . The positive formulas defining the prefixes are now defined as: δ
r
r := Kbp,
δri−1 := Ka(¬p ∨ δ
r
i ) for i an even natural number, and δ
r
i−1 := Kb(p ∨ δ
r
i ) for i an odd
natural number.
Corollary 5.13 The positively definable restrictions of N r are: all states, the p-states, the
¬p-states, any finite prefix of the a-b-chain N r, and the union or intersection of any of the
previous.
Lemma 5.14 M l0 |= + (Lbp→ Lap)
Proof Let T ⊆ D(M) be positively definable and such that 0 ∈ T . Then either M l|T is
a prefix of M l containing 0, or M l|T consists of disconnected parts of which M l|{0} is a
singleton part. In the second case, from (M l|{0})0 |= ¬Lap and (M
l|{0})0 |= ¬Lbp follows
(M l|{0})0 |= Lap → Lbp. In the first case, as M
l|T is a prefix of M containing 0, the
a-link to −1 (where −1 may be l) must always be included in that restriction if the b-link
to 1 is included. Therefore (M l|T )0 |= Lbp → Lap. From (M
l|T )0 |= Lbp → Lap for all T
containing 0, and the observation that all such T are positively definable (Lemma 5.12), it
follows that M l0 |= + (Lbp→ Lap). 
Lemma 5.15 N r0 6|= + (Lbp→ Lap)
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Proof The prefix T = {0, . . . , r} of N r is positively definable by δr0 ∈ L
+
el (see above). We
now have that (N r|δr0)0 |= Lbp, because 0 ∼b 1 and (N
r|δr0)1 |= p, but (N
r|δr0)0 6|= Lap,
because state −1 (and any other state i < −1) has been eliminated by the announcement
of δr0. Therefore, (N
r|δr0)0 |= Lbp∧¬Lap. From that and N
r
0 |= δ
r
0 (as 0 ∈ T ) it follows that
N r0 |= 〈δ
r
0〉(Lbp ∧ ¬Lap). Therefore N
r
0 |= 3+ (Lbp ∧ ¬Lap), i.e., N
r
0 6|= + (Lbp→ Lap). 
The following lemma is very crucial. Note that the restrictions below can be for any
subset of the domain, not necessarily positively definable.
Lemma 5.16 Given are restricted models M of M l and N of N r, and i, j ∈ N with
i ∈ D(M) and j ∈ D(N). If Mi ≃
n Nj, then for all ψ ∈ Lel such that Mi |= ψ there is a
ψ′ ∈ Lel such that (M |ψ)i ≃
n (N |ψ′)j, and for all ψ
′ ∈ Lel such that Nj |= ψ
′ there is a
ψ ∈ Lel such that (M |ψ)i ≃
n (N |ψ′)j.
Proof Given ψ ∈ Lel with Mi |= ψ, let M
′
i be obtained by restricting (M |ψ)i to states
at most n steps, on either side, from i. We then have that M ′i ≃
n (M |ψ)i, and that M
′
i
is a finite chain of length at most 2n + 1. As any finite subset in N r is distinguishable
in Lel (using the distance from endpoint r, see Lemma 2.13), and therefore also any finite
subset in N , as it is a restriction of N r, and as M ′ ⊆ M and Mi ≃
n Nj, there is a ψ
′ ∈ Lel
and a finite N |ψ′ ⊆ N such that M ′i ≃
n (N |ψ′)j. From that and M
′
i ≃
n (M |ψ)i it follows
that (M |ψ)i ≃
n (N |ψ′)j. The proof in the other direction, assuming a ψ
′ ∈ Lel such that
Nj |= ψ
′, is similar. 
It is important to note that in the above proof the epistemic depths d(ψ) and d(ψ′) are
not related to n: they are arbitrary and therefore can be larger than n.
Lemma 5.17 Let M ⊆ M l, N ⊆ N r, i, j ∈ N with i ∈ D(M) and j ∈ D(N), and n ∈ N:
if Mi ≃
n Nj, then Mi ≡
n
apal Nj.
Proof We show the equivalent formulation:
For all ϕ ∈ Lapal , M ⊆ M
l, N ⊆ N r, i, j ∈ N with i ∈ D(M) and j ∈ D(N),
and n ∈ N: if Mi ≃
n Nj and d(ϕ) ≤ n, then Mi |= ϕ iff Nj |= ϕ.
The proof is by induction on the structure of ϕ. The cases of interest are Kaϕ, [ψ]ϕ, and
2ϕ. The first two cases are similar to those shown in Lemma 5.9, and therefore shown in
less detail. As n-bisimilarity is a symmetric relation, it suffices to show only one direction
of the equivalence.
Case Kaϕ: Suppose d(Kaϕ) ≤ n. We have Mi |= Kaϕ if and only if for all i
′ ∼a i,
Mi′ |= ϕ. As Mi ≃
n Nj, for all j
′ ∼a j there is some i
′ ∼a i such that Mi′ ≃
n−1 Nj′. By
the induction hypothesis, given d(ϕ) ≤ n− 1, we have for all j′ ∼a j, Nj′ |= ϕ. Therefore
Nj |= Kaϕ.
Case [ψ]ϕ: Suppose d([ψ]ϕ) ≤ n, and Mi |= [ψ]ϕ. By the definition of d we may
suppose that d(ψ) = x and d(ϕ) = y where x + y ≤ n. Let R0 ⊇ · · · ⊇ Rn be such that
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R0 : Mi ≃
0 Nj, . . . , R
n : Mj ≃
n Nj. For all (i
′, j′) ∈ Rx, we have Mi′ ≃
x Nj′, so by the
induction hypothesis, Mi′ |= ψ if and only if Nj′ |= ψ. Therefore, if Mi 6|= ψ then Nj 6|= ψ
and vacuously Nj |= [ψ]ϕ, as required. Suppose now that Mi |= ψ. We define the series
of relations from (M |ψ) to (N |ψ) for z = 0, . . . , y: Qz = {(i′, j′) ∈ Rn−z | Mi′ |= ψ}. The
conditions atoms, forth and back for the bounded bisimulation of Definition 2.5 hold for
Q0, . . . ,Qy, and so (M |ψ)i ≃
y (N |ψ)j . Applying the induction hypothesis once again, we
have (M |ψ)i |= ϕ implies (N |ψ)j |= ϕ, and so Nj |= [ψ]ϕ.
Case 2ϕ:
To match the previous lemma, we show the dual diamond form.
Mi |= 3ϕ
⇔
there is ψ ∈ Lel ,Mi |= 〈ψ〉ϕ
⇔
there is ψ ∈ Lel ,Mi |= ψ and (M |ψ)i |= ϕ
⇔ Lemma 5.16
there is ψ′ ∈ Lel , Nj |= ψ
′ and (N |ψ′)j |= ϕ
⇔
there is ψ′ ∈ Lel , Nj |= 〈ψ
′〉ϕ
⇔
Nj |= 3ψ 
Corollary 5.18 Let ϕ ∈ Lapal , l < −d(ϕ) and r > d(ϕ). Then M
l
0 |= ϕ iff N
r
0 |= ϕ.
Theorem 5.19 APAL is not at least as expressive as APAL+ for multiple agents.
Proof Consider the formula + (Lbp → Lap). Let us suppose that + (Lbp → Lap) is
equivalent to a Lapal formula ϕ. The epistemic depth of this formula is d(ϕ). Let M
l
0 and
N r0 be such that |l|, r > d(ϕ). Then:
1. M l0 |= + (Lbp→ Lap) (Lemma 5.14);
2. N r0 6|= + (Lbp→ Lap) (Lemma 5.15);
3. M l0 |= ϕ iff N
r
0 |= ϕ (Corollary 5.18).
This is a contradiction. Therefore, no such equivalent Lapal formula exists. 
Corollary 5.20 APAL and APAL+ have incomparable expressivity.
Proof From Theorem 5.11 and Theorem 5.19. 
The relative expressivity of APAL+ to group announcement logic and coalition an-
nouncement logic, mentioned in the introduction, has recently been addressed in [17, 19].
It is shown that GAL is not at least as expressive as CAL and that APAL is not at least as
expressive as CAL, with chain models for three agents instead of the two agent a-b-chains
in our contribution. Whether CAL is not at least as expressive as GAL is an open question.
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6 Axiomatisation
In this section we provide a sound and complete axiomatisation for arbitrary positive
announcement logic. It is as the (infinitary) axiomatisation for arbitrary public announce-
ment logic given by Balbiani et al. [5, 6], but with restrictions to positive announcements
in appropriate axioms.
Definition 6.1 Consider a new symbol ♯. The necessity forms are defined inductively as:
ψ(♯) ::= ♯ | (ϕ→ ψ(♯)) | [ϕ]ψ(♯) | Kaψ(♯)
where ϕ ∈ L+apal and a ∈ A.
A necessity form contains a unique occurrence of the symbol ♯. If ψ(♯) is a necessity form
and ϕ ∈ L+apal , then ψ(ϕ) ∈ L
+
apal , where ψ(ϕ) stands for the substitution of the unique
occurrence of ♯ in ψ(♯) by ϕ. We also call ψ(ϕ) an instantiation of ψ(♯).
The axiomatisation APAL+ω is given below. A formula is a theorem if it belongs to the
least set of formulas containing all axioms and closed under the derivation rules.
Definition 6.2 The axiomatisation APAL+ω consists of the following axioms and rules.
In the rule R+ω, the expressions χ([ψ]ϕ) and χ(+ϕ) are instantiations of a necessity form
χ(♯).
P All propositional tautologies K Ka(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Kaϕ→ Kaψ)
T Kaϕ→ ϕ 4 Kaϕ→ KaKaϕ
5 ¬Kaϕ→ Ka¬Kaϕ AP [ϕ]p↔ (ϕ→ p)
AN [ϕ]¬ψ ↔ (ϕ→ ¬[ϕ]ψ) AC [ϕ](ψ ∧ χ)↔ ([ϕ]ψ ∧ [ϕ]χ)
AK [ϕ]Kaψ ↔ (ϕ→ Ka[ϕ]ψ) AA [ϕ][ψ]χ↔ [ϕ ∧ [ϕ]ψ]χ
A+ +ϕ→ [ψ]ϕ where ψ ∈ L
+
el MP From ϕ and ϕ→ ψ infer ψ
NecK From ϕ infer Kaϕ NecA From ϕ infer [ψ]ϕ
R+ω From χ([ψ]ϕ) for every ψ ∈ L+el infer χ(+ϕ)
The axiomatisation APAL+ω is identical to the axiomatisation APAL
ω in [5] and to
the axiomatisation APAL in [6], except for the replacement of the APAL 2 by the APAL+
+ on two occasions, resulting in the axiom A+ and the rule R+ω. Other, non-essential
differences are the different names for axioms and rules, for example the axiom we call K
they call A1, the axiom we call T they call A4, and so on; and the presence of additional,
known to be derivable, axioms in [6].
Note that the proof of completeness of APAL given in [5] was wrong and that a correct
proof of completeness has been given in [6, 4].
Theorem 6.3 The infinitary axiomatisation APAL+ω is sound and strongly complete for
the logic APAL+.
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Proof The soundness of the axiomatisation is evident as the axiom A+ and the rule R+ω
follow the semantics of the + operator (just as their non-positive counterparts followed the
semantics of the 2 operator), and all remaining axioms and rules are, as well-known,
standard from epistemic logic and public announcement logic.
The completeness proof proceeds exactly as in [6], with appropriate restrictions from
epistemic announcements to positive announcements in the cases of A+ and R+ω.
More precisely, the positive arbitrary announcement operator + only features in the
subinductive case [ψ]+χ and in the inductive case +ψ of the proof of the Truth Lemma.
The Truth Lemma for APAL is proved by a complexity measure wherein [ψ]ϕ is less
complex than 2ϕ for any ψ ∈ Lel . Similarly, [ψ]ϕ is less complex than +ϕ for any ψ ∈ L
+
el .
This justifies that substituting ‘epistemic’ for ‘positive’ in appropriate places is sufficient.
No other changes are required. 
We note that APAL+ω is an infinitary axiomatisation, as the rule R+
ω requires an
infinite number of premises. Just as for the infinitary axiomatisation of the logic APAL, it
is unknown if a finitary axiomatisation exists.
7 Conclusion
We presented a variant of arbitrary public announcement logic called positive arbitrary
public announcement logic, APAL+, which restricts arbitrary public announcements to
announcement of positive formulas. We showed that the model checking complexity of
APAL+ is PSPACE-complete, that APAL+ is more expressive than public announcement
logic PAL, that it is incomparable with APAL, and we provided a sound and complete in-
finitary axiomatisation. The proof of the decidability of APAL+ is reported in a companion
paper [34].
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